Trump schließt Militäraktion gegen Iran aus
Neben seiner Ankündigung, alle Sanktionen gegen Syrien ohne Vorbedingungen aufheben zu wollen, machte Donal Trump auf seinem Trip an den Golf auch klar, dass die Verhandlungen mit dem Iran zu seiner Zufriedenheit verliefen und schloss Militäraktionen gegen das iranische Nuklearprogramm nun faktisch aus. Erneut lobte er dabei die konstruktive Rolle Katars (ohne zu erwähnen, dass Doha jahrelang die Hamas finanziert hat):
Donald Trump says Iran has “sort of” agreed to the terms of a deal on the future terms of its nuclear programme.
On a visit to Doha, the US president said: “I want them to succeed. I want them to end up being a great country. But they cannot have a nuclear weapon. It is very simple really. It’s not like I need to give you 30 pages worth of details. It is only one sentence – they cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
Referring to the possibility of a US attack on Iran, he added: “We are not going to make any nuclear dust in Iran. I think we’re getting close to maybe doing a deal without having to do this. You probably read today the story about Iran. It’s sort of agreed to … the terms.”
Trump’s remarks add credence to reports that Steve Witkoff, his special envoy to the Middle East, gave the Iranian negotiating team in Oman at the weekend the outlines of a proposal that Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, took back to Tehran. (…)
Trump praised the role of Qatar and made reference to Israel’s belief that Iran’s nuclear sites should be attacked, saying: “Iran should seriously thank the emir of Qatar, because there are others who want to deal a hard blow to Iran, unlike Qatar.”
Auch diese Entwicklung verfolgt man in Israel mit großer Sorge:
This “America First” approach – where what’s good for America is defined almost exclusively in terms of dollars and deals – puts him on a collision course with Israel over key issues: Iran, the Houthis, Syria, massive Saudi arms deals, and even the possibility of US support for a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom.
For this White House, each of these issues seems to be viewed through an economic prism: the cost of striking Iran’s nuclear program, weighed against the fallout a retaliatory strike on Saudi and UAE oil fields may have on the US economy; the financial cost of an extended bombing campaign against the Houthis; the benefit of easing sanctions on Syria as a way of repaying Saudi Arabia and the UAE for their economic largesse.
This marks a shift in US emphasis in the region. American policy in the Middle East was once a balancing act – sometimes better, sometimes worse – between interests and values. Now, the scale has tipped heavily toward interests, and increasingly, economic ones.